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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD
SCHOOL CONCEPT: THE DEMISE OF THE DE JURE-DE FACTO DISTINC-
ToN-Seattle School District No. I v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996
(W.D. Wash. 1979), appeal docketed No. 79-4676 (9th Cir. Sept. 19,
1979).
On November 7, 1978, voters of the State of Washington passed Initia-
tive Measure 350, an "antibusing" statute,1 which would prohibit the
assignment of public school students to any school other than the one
nearest, or next nearest, their residence. 2 The Seattle School District sub-
sequently brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington seeking to enjoin implementation of the initiative
1. The term "antibusing statute," as used throughout this note, refers to any statute that impedes
the racial integration of public school students through a restriction on the transportation or assign-
ment of public school students. See generally North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S.
43, 44 n. 1 (1971) (statute provided: "No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school
on account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio of
race, religion or national origins. Involuntary bussing of students in contravention of this article is
prohibited and public funds shall not be used for any such bussing."); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp.
710, 712 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (statute stated: "[N]o student shall be as-
signed or compelled to attend any school on account of race .... ").
2. Initiative Measure 350, as adopted by the voters of Washington, provides:
Section 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the effective date of this act no
school board, school district, educational service district board, educational service district,
or county committee, nor the superintendent of public instruction, nor the state board of edu-
cation, nor any of their respective employees, agents or delegates shall directly or indirectly
require any student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or
next nearest the student's place of residence within the school district of his or her residence
and which offers the course of study pursued by such student, except in the following in-
stances:
(1) If a student requires special education, care or guidance, he may be assigned and trans-
ported to the school offering courses and facilities for such special education, care or guid-
ance;
(2) If there are health or safety hazards, either natural or man made, or physical barriers or
obstacles, either natural or man made, between the student's place of residence and the near-
est or next nearest school; or
(3) If the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inadequate
because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities.
Sec. 2. In every such instance where a student is assigned and transported to a school other
than the one nearest his place of residence, he shall be assigned and transported to the next
geographically nearest school with the necessary and applicable courses and facilities within
the school district of his or her residence.
Sec. 3. For purposes of section 1 of this act, "indirectly require any student to attend a
school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's
place of residence within the school district of his or her residence and which offers the course
of study pursued by such student" includes, but is not limited to, implementing, continuing,
pursuing, maintaining or operating any plan involving (1) the redefining of attendance zones;
(2) feeder schools; (3) the re-organization of the grade structure of the schools; (4) the pairing
of schools; (5) the merging of schools; (6) the clustering of schools; or (7) any other combina-
tion of grade restructuring, pairing, merging or clustering: PROVIDED, That nothing in this
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on the ground that the measure would re-segregate3 Seattle public schools
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The district court ruled in fa-
vor of the Seattle School District, holding that the initiative was passed
with discriminatory intent, that it improperly prohibited mandatory bus-
ing only when used to achieve racial balance, and that it improperly re-
stricted the ability of local school boards to eliminate illegal segregation. 5
This note analyzes the district court's opinion in Seattle School District
No. 1 v. Washington in the context of current doctrines in the field of
school desegregation and concludes that the protected status previously
accorded to the neighborhood concept6 will be substantially undermined
if the Seattle decision is upheld on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
The earliest school desegregation cases to reach the United States Su-
preme Court challenged the constitutionality of racially segregated school
districts within which minority students were prohibited by law from at-
tending majority-race schools. 7 The cases generally arose out of southern
chapter shall limit the authority of any school district to close school facilities.
Sec. 4. For the purposes of section 1 of this act "special education, care or guidance"
includes the education, care or guidance of students who are physically, mentally or emotion-
ally handicapped.
Sec. 5. The prohibitions of this chapter shall not preclude the establishment of schools
offering specialized or enriched educational programs which students may voluntarily choose
to attend, or of any other voluntary option offered to students.
Sec. 6. This chapter shall not prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from adjudicat-
ing constitutional issues relating to the public schools.
Sec. 7. Sections 1 through 6 of this act are added to chapter 223, Laws of 1969 ex. sess.
and shall constitute a new chapter in Title 28A RCW.
Sec. 8. If any provision of this act, or its application to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, the remainder of the act, or the application of the provision to other persons or cir-
cumstances is not affected.
Secretary of State, 1978 Washington Voters Pamphlet 6 (text of proposed statute).
3. Prior to the enactment of Initiative Measure 350, the Seattle School Board adopted a plan to
desegregate Seattle public schools which required the mandatory busing of students. That plan be-
came operative shortly before Initiative Measure 350 was passed. The implementation of the initia-
tive would require the elimination of mandatory busing and the assignment of students to neighbor-
hood schools. Because housing in Seattle is segregated, such a neighborhood school plan would
result in racially imbalanced schools.
4. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-4676 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1979).
5. Id. at 1012.
6. The term "neighborhood school concept" as used herein refers to a student assignment plan
under which school authorities assign students to schools on a geographical basis, generally within
walking distance of their homes.
7. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reviewing Brown v. Board of Educ., 98
F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (Topeka, Kansas), and companion cases: Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F.
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school districts, where opposition to racial integration in education was
pronounced. 8 The Supreme Court, beginning with its decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,9 has held that the maintenance of such school sys-
tems violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. '0
Unlike southern school segregation, racial imbalance in public schools
in northern school districts was generally not required by state law. 11
Nevertheless, in many instances racial segregation in public schools out-
side the South was the result of a deliberate policy of discrimination by
state officials. 12 The Supreme Court, in the first case before it to chal-
lenge nonstatutory public school segregation, chose not to extend its
holding in Brown to apply to all school segregation. 13 Instead, the Court
adopted a more limited approach and held that only segregation brought
about intentionally by state officials violates the fourteenth amendment. 14
The Court thus established, for constitutional purposes, the existence of
two distinct forms of segregation: de jure, which results from the inten-
tionally discriminatory acts of state officials; and de facto, which occurs
as a result of conduct which cannot be traced to public officials acting
with discriminatory intent. 15 Whereas de jure segregation violates the
Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952) (Clarendon County, S.C.); Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (Prince Edward County, Va.); and Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d
137 (1952) (New Castle County, Del.).
8. See Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 39 LAW & CoN'Tmp. PROB. 7, 11-16 (1975); J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE Su-
PREME COURTAND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 61-127 (1979).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at493.
11. See SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES (B. Reams & P. Wilson, ed.
1975) (survey of state laws prior to the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ.). The survey indicates
that at the time of the Brown decision, 17 of 37 states surveyed required or permitted segregated
schools as a matter of state law. The 17 states comprised the Confederate South (Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia), as well as Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia. Eight
states (California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island)
repealed statutory authority to segregate schools prior to 1953. The 12 remaining states surveyed had
never required or permitted segregation in public schools as a matter of state law: Connecticut, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin.
12. E.g., Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734,744 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443
F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971).
13. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (Denver, Colorado). See Lawrence,
Segregation "Misunderstood": The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 15, 22 n. 29
(1977).
14. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,208 (1973).
15. "We emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate." Id. at 208 (emphasis in original).
With regard to the creation of racially segregated school districts in the United States, Justice
Powell has indicated his view that:
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fourteenth amendment and must be eliminated "root and branch,"16 de
facto segregation does not constitute a proper basis for finding a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17
Where it has been established that public school segregation violates
the fourteenth amendment, school officials are under a constitutional duty
to eliminate the illegal condition. 18 While school officials retain some
flexibility in devising desegregation plans, the methods adopted must be
effective in swiftly rectifying the violation. 19 In many circumstances this
has required the imposition of some degree of mandatory busing of public
school students. 20 Accordingly, every antibusing statute enacted within a
school district containing de jure segregation has been struck down as
improperly impeding the elimination of illegal segregation. 21 In the only
such case to reach the United States Supreme Court, North Carolina State
The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across the coun-
try-North and South-is the imbalance in residential patterns. Such residential patterns are
typically beyond the control of school authorities. For example, discrimination in housing-
whether public or private-cannot be attributed to school authorities. Economic pressures and
voluntary preferences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.
Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (mem.) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The Development of a Theory of Equal Protection
Remedies, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 382 (1977).
The "magnet" effect, which assumes that segregated schools cause an increase in the segrega-
tion of the surrounding neighborhood, is a doubtful approximation of the reality of urban demo-
graphic patterns. Moreover, the presumption that a school board which has intentionally segre-
gated students in one area has also caused all the segregation in the rest of the district is often
incorrect. Demographic shifts which increase segregation often have no connection with the
conduct of the school board. [Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)]
recognized such random shifts over a period of one year; they could be much greater over a
longer time span. Urban economic deterioration may result in a large loss of white population in
a city; neighborhoods rise and fall as highways are constructed and as industrial and commercial
patterns change.
Id. at 403-404 (footnotes omitted). But see Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There is But
One Constitution, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 11 (1972) ("[I]t is only a half truth to suggest that
school authorities are not responsible for housing patterns .. ").
16. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968).
17. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
18. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968).
19. Id. at 439.
20. See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
We likewise conclude that an absolute prohibition against transportation of students assigned on
the basis of race, "or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio," will similarly hamper the
ability of local authorities to effectively remedy constitutional violations. As noted in [Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)], supra, at 29, . . . bus transporta-
tion has long been an integral part of all public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly
effective remedy could be devised without continued reliance upon it.
Id. at 46.
21. See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Stell v. Board of
Public Educ. for Savannah and Chatham County, 334 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Lee v. Nyquist,
318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Alabama v. United States, 314 F.
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Board of Education v. Swann,22 the Court invalidated a North Carolina
antibusing statute enacted after North Carolina schools were under a fed-
eral court order to desegregate. 23 The Supreme Court's invalidation of the
North Carolina statute rested solely on the basis of that statute's interfer-
ence with the elimination of de jure segregation. 24
Whether an antibusing statute violates the constitution in a school dis-
trict which has not been found to contain de jure segregation is a question
left open by Swann and raised by the passage of Initiative Measure 350 in
Washington.
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. The Application of Hunter v. Erickson
As its initial basis for holding Initiative Measure 350 unconstitutional,
the district court in Seattle relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Hunter v. Erickson.25 In Hunter, voters in Akron, Ohio, passed a city
charter amendment requiring all ordinances pertaining to the regulation of
real property transactions on the basis of "race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry" to be submitted to the voters of Akron for majority
approval. 26 The Supreme Court found the amendment unconstitutional
Supp. 1319 (S.D. Ala. 1970); School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 366 Mass. 315, 319
N.E.2d 427 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975). Cf. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v.
Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669, 670 (1971), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012
(1971) (Education Code providing that "no governing board of a school district shall require any
student or pupil to be transported for any purpose or for any reason without the written permission of
the parent or guardian," held constitutional on the ground that such provision only prohibits school
districts from compelling students to use transportation provided by the school district without paren-
tal consent).
22. 402U.S.43(1971).
23. Id. at 45-46.
24. The Court stated:
The legislation before us flatly forbids assignment of any student on account of race or for the
purpose of creating a racial balance or ratio in the schools. The prohibition is absolute, and it
would inescapably operate to obstruct the remedies granted by the District Court in the Swann
case. But more important the statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assign-
ment plans by directing that they be "color blind"; that requirement, against the background of
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) . . . . Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a consti-
tutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school authorities
of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate
existing dual school systems.
Id.
25. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). See 473 F. Supp. at 1012.
26. 393 U.S. at 387. The amendment to Akron City Charter § 137 provided:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of the City of Akron which regulates the use, sale,
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because it procedurally disadvantaged "those who would benefit from the
laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those
who would bar other discriminations. "27
The Seattle court noted that Hunter had been applied by a federal dis-
trict court in Lee v. Nyquist28 to a New York antibusing statute that expli-
citly prohibited the assignment of students to any school "on account of
race . . . or for the purpose of achieving equality in attendance ...of
persons of one or more particular races. "29 The Lee court found the New
York statute impermissible under Hunter because it treated "educational
matters involving racial criteria differently from other educational mat-
ters," 30 and thus made it "more difficult to deal with racial imbalance in
the public schools." 31
From Hunter and Lee, the Seattle court extracted the principle that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits mandatory student assignments to public
schools for nonracial reasons unless such assignments are also permitted
for racial reasons. 32 The district court concluded that Initiative Measure
350 falls within this prohibition by implicitly prohibiting mandatory stu-
dent assignments only for racial purposes. 33
B. The Existence ofDiscriminatory Intent
The Seattle court predicated its holding that Initiative Measure 350 is
advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of any
kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry
must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general
election before said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the




28. 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
29. Id. at 712. Section 3201(2) of the New York statute provided in pertinent part:
2. Except with the express approval of a board of education having jurisdiction, a majority of
the members of such board having been elected, no student shall be assigned or compelled to
attend any school on account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of
achieving equality in attendance or increased attendance or reduced attendance, at any school, of
persons of one or more particular races, creeds, colors, or national origins; and no school dis-
trict, school zone or attendance unit, by whatever name known, shall be established, reorga-
nized or maintained for any such purpose, provided that nothing contained in this section shall
prevent the assignment of a pupil in the manner requested or authorized by his parents or guard-




32. 473 F. Supp. at 1012.
33. Id. at 1013.
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unconstitutional on the additional ground that the measure was passed
with discriminatory intent on the part of Washington voters. 34 The court
was admittedly unable to determine the subjective intent of the voters, for
"the secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier" to the 'ascertainment of
the electorate's intent. 35 Nevertheless, it inferred that the intent behind
the measure's enactment was discriminatory by applying the factors de-
lineated by the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corporation.36
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court indicated that the following
criteria are relevant in ascertaining discriminatory intent: disproportionate
impact; procedural and substantive departures from the normal decision-
making sequence; and legislative and administrative history of the chal-
lenged action. 37 In applying the Arlington Heights factors to Initiative
Measure 350, the Seattle court found initially that implementation of the
measure would have a disproportionate impact upon racial minorities be-
cause racially segregated schools are disproportionately harmful to mi-
nority students.38 Additionally, the court considered the enactment of Ini-
tiative Measure 350 a marked departure from the procedural norm
because a statewide initiative was used to repeal an administrative deci-
sion of a local school board. 39 Finally, the court reviewed the historical
background of Initiative Measure 350 and decided that the "thought of a
statewide initiative" was triggered by the Seattle School Board's adop-
34. Id. at 1016.
35. Id. at 1014.
36. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Seattle court also relied on Personnel Administrator of Massachu-
setts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), involving a challenge under the equal protection clause to the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts law granting civil service employment preference to military
veterans. 473 F. Supp. at 1014. The Supreme Court in Feeney held that the differential impact of the
statute on women was insufficient to establish the discriminatory intent necessary to find a constitu-
tional violation under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights. 442 U.S. at
275-81.
37. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
38. 473 F. Supp. at 1015. The court did not, however, differentiate between de jure and de facto
segregation in concluding that segregation is disproportionately harmful to minority students.
It appears from the evidence that the overall education of students in a school system suffers
when the schools of that system are racially imbalanced, that the greater the imbalance the
greater the impairment and that there is a disproportionate impact upon the education of minority
children when their schools are racially imbalanced.
Id.
39. Id. at 1016. The Seattle court stated:
In the adoption of Initiative 350 there was a marked departure from the procedural norm in
that an administrative decision of a subordinate local unit of government, the Seattle School
Board, was overridden in a statewide initiative by voters, a great number of whom were entirely
unaffected by that plan and who could not conceivably be affected by any plan for the mandatory
assignment of students for racial balancing purposes.
Id. In contrast to the Supreme Court's analysis in Arlington Heights, the Seattle court failed to estab-
Washington Law Review
tion of a desegregation plan requiring mandatory busing.40 These findings
led the court to conclude that the Washington electorate intended to dis-
criminate against minority students by enacting Initiative Measure 350.4 1
C. The Over-Inclusiveness of Initiative Measure 350
As a final basis for holding Initiative Measure 350 invalid, the Seattle
court decided that the initiative would unconstitutionally restrict the abil-
ity of local school boards to eliminate de jure segregation if such segrega-
tion exists in Washington. 42 The court did not, however, make any find-
ings of fact with regard to the existence of such segregation. 43
III. ANALYSIS
The district court's opinion in Seattle is significant both in its extension
of Hunter v. Erickson to antibusing statutes enacted within de facto segre-
gated school districts44 and in its finding that racially imbalanced schools
have a disproportionate impact on minority students. 45 The application of
Hunter may effectively foreclose further attempts to enact antibusing stat-
utes in segregated school districts. Furthermore, the finding that minority
students are disproportionately affected by segregated schools, without
distinguishing between de jure and de facto segregation, raises questions
over the continued vitality of this distinction. 46 With respect to both the
extension of Hunter and the finding of disproportionate impact, however,
lish the materiality of the procedural departure to the question of intent. A procedural departure does
not indicate ipsofacto an intent to discriminate against minorities. With regard to the initiative pro-
cess, it is arguable that the procedure of statewide voting is beneficial to minorities (at least where the
substance of the initiative is not racially discriminatory) because it ensures their participation in the
decision to adopt the proposed legislation. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (referen-
dum required for approval of low-income housing upheld as enabling people to have "a voice in
decisions that will affect the future development of their own community."). But see Bell, The Refer-
endum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978) (use of referenda and
initiatives subjects minority interests to majoritarian biases); Comment, Judicial Review of Lavs En-
acted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1979) (initiative legislation should be subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment to guard minority rights).
40. 473 F. Supp. at 1016.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Seeid. at 998-1011.
44. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Hunter v. Erickson was first applied to an anti-
busing statute in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra.
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analytical weaknesses in the district court's opinion suggest that the
court's rationale may be modified on appeal.
The application of Hunter to Initiative Measure 350 poses several diffi-
culties. In Hunter, the voters of Akron were attempting to inject the crite-
rion of race into an otherwise neutral legislative process. 47 The voters of
Washington, by passing Initiative Measure 350, were attempting to re-
move race as a factor in the assignment of students to public schools. 48
Furthermore, in Hunter the city charter amendment implicitly classified
Akron citizens by race, and subjected minorities to a different, and more
burdensome, procedure to enact legislation. 49 Initiative Measure 350, by
contrast, would have categorically precluded consideration of race in stu-
dent assignments to nonneighborhood schools, since it does not classify
students according to race. 50
In addition to the theoretical difficulties of applying Hunter to Initiative
Measure 350, the practicality of the rule adopted by the Seattle court is
also questionable. Initiative Measure 350 permits nonneighborhood stu-
dent assignments only for reasons of safety and special education. 51 The
47. Under the city charter amendment adopted in Akron, the procedural means by which legisla-
tion became effective was determined by the pertinence of the legislation to the interests of racial
minorities. If the proposed legislation furthered minority interests, a more difficult procedure to enact
the legislation was required. 393 U.S. at 390.
48. "[Initiative Measure 350] was conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for the specific
purpose of overriding the decision of the Seattle School Board to balance Seattle schools racially by
means of student assignments." 473 F. Supp. at 1015.
49. The improper racial classification created by the charter amendment in Hunter resulted not
from the differentiation between legislation pertaining to race and that which was race-neutral, but
more precisely from the fact that the dichotomization of legislation served to classify Akron citizens
by race. The Court stated:
Section 137 thus drew a distinction between those groups who sought the law's protection
against racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale and rental of real estate and
those who sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other ends.
Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical
manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority.
393 U.S. at 390-91.
50. Initiative Measure 350 would remove consideration of a student's race in the decision to
assign a student beyond neighborhood schools, but would permit student assignments for racial bal-
ancing purposes with regard to the two schools to which a student may be assigned. See note 2 supra.
Furthermore, the measure permits school boards to desegregate through voluntary programs. Id.
Though previous voluntary desegregation programs have been unsuccessful in some areas, see, e.g.,
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968), and Raney v. Board of Educ. of the
Gould School Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 446 (1968), the Seattle School District implemented such a pro-
gram in 1977 and termed the results "successful in promoting significant new student movement,
much of which positively affected racial balance." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 8, Seattle School




Seattle court found it improper, under Hunter, to permit such nonneigh-
borhood assignments while concomitantly prohibiting nonneighborhood
student assignments for racial balancing purposes. 52 Under the analysis
adopted by the court, Hunter can thus be complied with in either of two
ways: by allowing students to be assigned to nonneighborhood schools
for racial reasons; or by prohibiting all nonneighborhood student assign-
ments. To the extent that the Seattle court's opinion encourages the latter
position, it forecloses the use of busing for the legitimate purposes of
facilitating safety and special education.
Unlike the district court's improper reliance on Hunter, the finding that
Initiative Measure 350 was passed with discriminatory intent is within
traditional equal protection analysis applicable to school desegregation
cases. 53 Given the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence regarding the
subjective intent of Washington voters in passing the initiative, 54 the
court looked to the Arlington Heights factors55 to discern the intent of the
Washington electorate. 56 The Seattle court's application of those factors,
however, and its resulting conclusion, render acceptance of its analysis
doubtful.
According to the Supreme Court, the essential distinction between de
jure and de facto segregation is the existence of an intent to discrimi-
nate. 57 Although the Court has approved of the application of its analysis
in Arlington Heights to school desegregation cases, 58 it has rejected a
finding of discriminatory intent from the maintenance of a racially imbal-
anced neighborhood school system. 59 If the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation is to remain viable, inferences of discriminatory
52. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
53. See generally Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973); Austin Independent School
Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.).
54. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
55. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
56. 473 F. Supp. at 1014-16.
57. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
58. See Metropolitan School Dist. of Perry Township, Marion County, Indiana v. Buckley, 429
U.S. 1068 (1977) (mem.); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977); School
Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam); Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S.
672 (1977) (per curiam).
59. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.) (judgment
vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis).
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973), had been thought to support the proposition that a state may not impose a neighborhood
school policy upon a residentially segregated school district. See, eg., Opinion of the Justices, 363
Mass. 899, 298 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1973). In Cisneros, however, the court made no finding of dis-
criminatory intent and stated:
Discriminatory motive and purpose, while they may reinforce a finding of effective segregation,
are not necessary ingredients of constitutional violations in the field of public education. We
therefore hold that the racial and ethnic segregation that exists in the Corpus Christi school
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intent from actions related to the maintenance of a neighborhood school
system is unconstitutional-not de facto, not de jure, but unconstitutional.
467 F.2d at 149.
In United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Austin Independent School Dist.), 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.), the court attempted to reconcile its holding (neighbor-
hood school system operated in a school district containing racially segregated housing pattern consti-
tutes de jure segregation) with that in Cisneros by stating that Cisneros actually involved the use of a
"foreseeable consequence" intent test. 532 F.2d at 388. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded it for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Austin Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.). A number of commentators
have taken the position that the Supreme Court thereby rejected the use of a foreseeable consequence
intent test in school desegregation cases. See Note, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 332 (1976). Cf. Note, 28 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 119, 141 (1977) ("Possibly there is an implication that finding intent under the tort
standard may not be adequate to find the unconstitutional intent."). On remand, however, the court
of appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's disapproval of its prior decision to extend only to the
inference of discriminatory intent from official actions taken to maintain a neighborhood school pol-
icy, not to the inference of discriminatory intent under the foreseeable consequence test:
We are well aware that some official actions on which a plaintiff hinges an allegation of uncon-
stitutional discrimination have historically been motivated by racially and ethnically neutral
bonafide concerns, such as the desire to have children attend the school closest to their home,
and no showing is made that those concerns were actually subordinate to, or a subterfuge for,
unconstitutional discrimination. In those circumstances, that a discriminatory result was the nat-
ural and foreseeable consequence of the actions is insufficient to infuse the challenged acts with
the type of discriminatory intent required by Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights....
There is language in our Austin I opinion that official discriminatory intent adequate to support
a finding of de jure segregation could be inferred solely from the school board's use of a neigh-
borhood school policy for student assignment. To the extent that Austin 11 can be so read, it is
inconsistent with Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. The Supreme Court recognized
this ambiguity in vacating our decision and remanding the case to us.
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Austin Independent School Dist.), 564 F.2d 162, 168-69
(1977), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1978). The court then applied a foreseeable consequence intent
test and found a discriminatory intent on the basis of actions unrelated to the operation of a racially
neutral neighborhood school policy. Id. at 171-74 (school authorities "maintained the segregated
identity of the schools through the use of dual-overlapping attendance zones, student assignment
policies, teacher assignment policies, school site selection, and gerrymandering.").
The validity of a foreseeable consequence intent test to ascertain discriminatory intent in the field
of public education has not been resolved by the Supreme Court. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals appears to have rejected the test, see Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d
579, 585 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974) and Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1974), other circuits have adopted it. See e.g., United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Austin Independent School Dist.), 564 F.2d 162, 168 (1977), cert.
denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1978); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974);
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). The utility of the test has been
questioned. See Note, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976):
In fact, the interpretation of intent as foreseeability amounts to a proscription of all racial
imbalance in public schools. Where any racial imbalance exists in a school district, the failure to
adopt policies that alleviate the imbalance necessarily maintains and perpetuates the imbalance.
Such a result is clearly natural and foreseeable. Thus any school authority that tolerates racially
imbalanced schools would be held to have acted with segregative intent under the foreseeability
test.
Since the foreseeability test disapproves all racial imbalance, it destroys the distinction
betwen [sic] de facto and de jure segregation-the distinction "segregative intent" was to have
defined.
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:735, 1980
should not be permitted. 60 The Seattle court nonetheless inferred discrim-
inatory intent on the part of the Washington electorate in enacting Initia-
tive Measure 350 solely on the basis of such actions.
To ascertain the intent of Washington voters, the district court exam-
ined the Arlington Heights factors of disproportionate impact, procedural
departure from the normal decision-making process, and historical back-
ground. 6 1 The court first determined that racially imbalanced schools
disproportionately affect the education of minority students.62 The court
Id. at 329-30.
There is language in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
that suggests the Court requires more than foreseeability:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as aware-
ness of consequences. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (concur-
ring opinion). It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of." its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
442 U.S. at 279 (footnotes omitted).
60. De facto segregation, where it exists, occurs primarily, if not exclusively, as a result of
student assignments to neighborhood schools. See Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implica-
tions for School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 164 (1975):
The northern city districts . . . show a moderate relationship between residential and school
segregation. Where neighborhoods are highly segregated, schools tend also to be highly segre-
gated . . . . Those school districts where the degree of school segregation is much less than
was predicted on the basis of their level of residential segregation are districts which put massive
integration plans into operation, curtailing the extent to which the neighborhood school concept
of pupil assignment was used.
Id. at 187. To infer discriminatory intent from the adoption or operation of a neighborhood school
policy is thus tantamount to inferring discriminatory intent directly from the existence of de facto
segregated schools.
61. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 38 and accompanying text supra. The Seattle court cited no authority for its conclu-
sion that racially imbalanced schools are, from the fact of segregation alone, disproportionately
harmful to minority students. The existing authority on the subject is divided. See, e.g., Note. Read-
ing the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De FactolDe Jure Distinction, 86 YALE
L.J. 317 (1976), wherein the author states:
One important ground for retaining the distinction between permissible and impermissible racial
imbalance may well be the perception that some instances of racial imbalance do not impose
significant harms. Where the racial imbalance produces no harm, or where remedying minimal
harms would entail massive desegregation costs, a finding of a constitutional violation seems
less justifiable.
Id. at 346 (footnotes omitted). See also Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
And Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 366 (1972) (contentions that de facto segregation
adversely affects school children "depend on factual generalizations to which neither intuition nor
empirical studies provide confident answers"). But see Weinberg, The Relationship Between School
Desegregation and Academic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CoNrrMP. PROB.
241 (1975) (concluding that desegregation has a positive effect on minority achievement levels). Cf.
Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 17, 24 (1978) (of 73 studies analyzed, 40 show a correlation between desegregation and
improved academic performance by black students, while 12 studies indicate that desegregation has a
negative effect on black achievement levels).
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concluded that since implementation of Initiative Measure 350 would re-
sult in racially imbalanced schools, 63 the initiative necessarily had a
disproportionate impact. According to the Seattle court, however, such a
disproportionate impact is inherent in all de facto segregated school dis-
tricts. 64
The Seattle court also found that a procedural departure occurred be-
cause of the use of a statewide initiative to override an "administrative"
decision of a local school board, 65 and that the initiative's historical back-
ground included a "series of lawsuits and a recall election, the objective
of which was to prevent the racial balancing of Seattle schools by means
of mandatory student assignments." 66 Neither finding, without more, es-
tablishes that a racially discriminatory intent was predominant over an
intent to preserve a racially neutral neighborhood school policy. 67 Never-
At least one commentator has observed that a finding that racial imbalance is itself harmful to
minority students could provide a basis for invalidating de facto segregation as violative of the four-
teenth amendement. See Goodman, De Facto Segregation: A Constitutional And Empirical Analysis,
60 CAL. L. REv. 275 (1972):
Though Brown left the legal issue of de facto segregation undecided, it may have gone far to-
ward foreclosing a critical factual issue. In finding that "[s]eparated educational facilities are
inherently unequal" and separation of the races in school "has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children," the Court may have supplied the central empirical premise for the argument
that de facto segregation amounts to a constitutional denial of equal educational opportunity.
Although Brown dealt with state-imposed separation of Negro students solely because of their
race, the same retarding and demoralizing effects upon black children might be found in a de
facto segregated school in a Northern ghetto.
Id. at 278-79 (footnotes omitted).
63. 473 F. Supp. at 1015.
64. The court's finding that racially imbalanced schools result in a disproportionate impact on
minority students was not confined to de jure segregated schools, but extended to all segregated
schools. See note 38 supra. See also, 473 F. Supp. at 1001 (Finding of Fact 3.2): "The term 'racial
imbalance' in a school is used to mean a disproportionately high minority enrollment in a particular
school in relation to districtwide minority student population."
65. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. Although the court characterized the Seattle
School Board's decision to implement a mandatory busing plan as an administrative decision, the
question of whether students should be assigned to neighborhood schools appears to be a matter of
legislative policy because it is of general concern to the state's citizens-particularly since the
Board's adoption of the mandatory busing plan was an abandonment of the traditional neighborhood
school policy in Seattle. See 473 F. Supp. at 1009 (Finding of Fact 7.28) ("It is clear from the
location of school buildings and the attendance lines drawn around those buildings that the Seattle
School District has traditionally adhered to a policy of the assignment of children to their neighbor-
hood schools.").
66. 473 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
67. With respect to the finding of a procedural departure, the court failed to indicate the connec-
tion between the particular departure and proof of discriminatory intent. The court noted that:
In the adoption of Initiative 350 there was a marked departure from the procedural norm in
that an administrative decision of a subordinate local unit of government, the Seattle School
Board, was overridden in a statewide initiative by voters, a great number of whom were entirely
unaffected by that plan and who could not conceivably be affected by any plan for the mandatory
assignment of students for racial balancing purposes.
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theless, the district court inferred the existence of a racially discrimina-
tory intent. 68 Not only does such an inference place directly into question
the continued vitality of the neighborhood school concept, but, to the ex-
tent that de facto segregation in public schools is attributable to the as-
signment of students to neighborhood schools, it destroys the distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court's opinion in Seattle School District No. I v. Wash-
ington is fundamentally unsound in its application of Hunter v. Erickson
to the prohibition of busing for racial balancing purposes and in its infer-
473 F. Supp. at 1016. The court did not offer any explanation for its assumption that persons within
Washington who would be unaffected by the Seattle School Board's mandatory busing plan would
thereby be likely to be motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose in voting for the initiative. The
court even noted in Finding of Fact 7.30 that "[m]any parents and voters who support neighborhood
schools do so in a sincere belief in the value of neighborhood schools irrespective of the racial distri-
bution of the students attending those schools." 473 F. Supp. at 1009. Nevertheless, the court appar-
ently assumed that any procedural departure ipsofacto manifests a discriminatory intent.
In finding that the historical background of Initiative Measure 350 supported an inference of dis-
criminatory intent, the Seattle court relied on the fact that a series of lawsuits and a recall election
preceded the initiative. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. Yet, the court did not find that the
lawsuits or election were themselves a result of a racially discriminatory intent. In its Finding of Fact
6. 1, the court found that ten lawsuits were filed in the eight-year period prior to the enactment of
Initiative Measure 350. 473 F. Supp. at 1005-06. Four of the suits sought increased integration in
Seattle schools. Two actions sought to have the neighborhood school policy declared a matter of
right. One suit concerned the recall of school board members who had voted in favor of mandatory
busing. Finally, three actions challenged the Seattle School Board's adoption in 1978 of a mandatory
busing plan. The latter actions were brought by members of Citizens for Voluntary Integration Com-
mittee (CiVIC), the organization that proposed Initiative Measure 350. The district court found that
CiVIC acted "legally and responsibly in its advocacy of Initiative 350" and that it did not direct "its
appeals to the racial biases of the voters." 473 F. Supp. at 1009. Nevertheless, without explaining
the relevance of such private actions to the question of intent, the court inferred from the fact of the
lawsuits that the Washington electorate must have been motivated by a discriminatory intent in its
adoption of Initiative Measure 350.
68. In other school desegregation cases in which a discriminatory intent has been inferred, courts
have based the inference on official actions, which, independent of the neighborhood school policy,
manifested a racially discriminatory intent. For example, in Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1978), the court focused on specific actions that produced an increase in segregation over what would
have occurred under the neutral operation of the neighborhood school plan. In explaining its finding
of discriminatory intent, the court relied on the following evidence:
(I) The redistricting of a high school attendance zone to exclude whites and produce a virtually all
black student population;
(2) The operation of a foreign language transfer program which was used to manipulate the racial
composition of a high school by permitting white students to transfer to predominately white schools;
(3) The drawing of an attendance zone for a new school which resulted in a 99% black student
body;
(4) The use of "optional areas" to permit white students to attend predominately white schools;
(5) The use of racially discriminatory admission policies of vocational schools;
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ence of discriminatory intent solely from the decision to maintain a neigh-
borhood school policy. Hunter v. Erickson's prohibition against restruc-
turing the political process to create a procedural barrier to minority
interests is irrelevant to the decision of a state's citizens to maintain a
traditional neighborhood school policy. Furthermore, to infer discrimina-
tory intent solely from such a decision erodes the distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation. If that distinction is to remain viable, the
Seattle court's decision should be remanded with instructions to deter-
mine intent on the basis of actions independent of the neighborhood
school policy.
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(6) The recruitment and assignment of staff members on a racially biased basis.
573 F.2d at 144. Similarly, in Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), the court, in the face of
a school board's claim that segregation resulted from a racially neutral neighborhood school policy,
based its finding of discriminatory intent on the following evidence:
(1) Segregation of faculty;
(2) Site selection and construction of new schools;
(3) School board cooperation in segregated housing;
(4) Segregation of black students within predominately white schools;
(5) Use of optional zones, boundary changes, special transfers, private rental facilities and porta-
ble classrooms.
607 F.2d at 723-34. See also United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.
1977) (discriminatory intent found, notwithstanding neighborhood school system, because of segre-
gated faculty assignment, student transfer policy that permitted 30% of white students assigned to
predominately black elementary schools to transfer to white schools, use of optional attendance zones
to manipulate racial balance, school construction resulting in segregated student population, and ac-
quiescence in deterioration of a predominately black high school); United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency (Austin Independent School Dist.), 564 F.2d 162 (1977), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1978)
(note 59 supra); Note, 44 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 775 (1976):
In those cases where the evidence has established that a school board deviated from its neighbor-
hood school plan and the pattern of deviations could only be explained as having been prompted
by racial considerations, any resulting segregation has been deemed impermissible de jure segre-
gation. For example, evidence of the gerrymandering of attendance zone lines and the initiation
of transfer policies to facilitate individual segregative choices is frequently produced at trial to
demonstrate that deviations from neighborhood plans were designed to create or perpetuate seg-
regated schools.
Id. at 777 (footnotes omitted).
